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This paper evaluates the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 
recently proposed by the European Commission. We find that if the CCCTB is 
introduced as it is currently proposed (including loss consolidation), then it is likely 
to impose large tax revenue costs of about one fifth of the corporate tax base. 
Second, we show that an application of the CCCTB proposals at only the European 
Union (EU) level would overlook the extent of profit shifting out of the EU and 
could lock in further unnecessary revenue losses. Third, major EU profit-shifting 
countries such as Luxembourg, Ireland and the Netherlands may experience 
significant revenue losses. Based on our analysis, the main policy recommendation 
is to consider extending the approach to a worldwide system, which would 
simultaneously deal with profit shifting within and out of the EU, and appears 
to offer the best prospect for revenue-positive, welfare-enhancing reform. For this 
to be viable, an immediate priority is to collate cross-country-comparable data and 
provide precise assessments of the range of policy scenarios.
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1. Introduction 
At present, European Union (EU) countries have self-determination with respect to 
the setting of corporate taxation. Over the last 20 years, this self-determination has 
led to a so-called “race to the bottom” in terms of corporate tax rates. Instead of 
cooperating with one another, EU countries have been competing over tax rates 
and tax bases, leading to a reduction in the size of the corporate tax base. In 
order to foster greater collaboration in international corporate taxation, a unitary 
approach (e.g. within the United States) may go a long way to mitigate the profit-
shifting activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs) located within the EU. Thus, 
in 2016, the EU renewed its interest in the adoption of a common consolidated 
corporate tax base (CCCTB).
This paper evaluates the European Commission’s proposals and assesses the 
impact on the corporate tax base, should the EU decide to go ahead with the CCCTB 
proposal or an alternative proposal without full consolidation (the common corporate 
tax base, or CCTB). The CCCTB proposal includes a single set of rules for calculating 
companies’ taxable profits in the EU, allowing the filing of a single tax return. 
The consolidated taxable profits would be shared between the EU member states 
in which the MNE group is active, using an apportionment formula. If the formula 
reflects companies’ economic activity, such as assets, sales and employment, this 
will guarantee that profits are aligned with economic activity, which has been the 
single most important goal of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project of 
the G20 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Most recently in the BEPS process, the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework has 
been working on designing a two-pillar approach. The first pillar is intended to 
overhaul the existing nexus and profit allocation rules to align taxing rights with 
the real economic activity of MNEs, making profit shifting more difficult to achieve, 
while the second pillar is intended to set a global minimum tax rate, making profit 
shifting less attractive even where feasible. At present, however, further progress is 
highly uncertain because at the same time, many countries have prepared digital 
sales taxes, which sidestep the need to allocate profits but also fail to address 
the underlying issues. The proposal for a CCCTB has the potential to deliver within 
the EU what it was hoped the OECD’s first pillar would do.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it is important to note 
that any analysis that tries to estimate the effects of a policy change like this, on 
a grand scale, is likely to encounter a number of challenges – especially in terms 
of data quality and the time period under investigation. Hence, an important goal 
of this paper is to comment on the quality of data available to scholars to make 
these types of assessments and to state how data could be improved in the future 
through open and transparent country-by-country reporting.
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Second, this paper uses data extracted from the Orbis database so as to undertake 
a simulation approach common in the literature (the alternative would be to use 
a computable general equilibrium model, e.g. the one used by the European 
Commission (2016). Our analysis differs from previous studies, such as Mintz and 
Smart (2004), Cobham and Loretz (2014) and Clausing (2016), in that it focuses on 
the CCCTB. In contrast with CCCTB-focused studies such as those of Devereux 
and Loretz (2008) and Nerudová, Solilová and Dobranschi (2016), in this paper we 
use a more recent data set with longer time series data. 
The use of the imperfect, but best available Orbis data enables us to evaluate the 
extent to which taxable profits would be redistributed, if they were to be aligned with 
the level of real economic activity, as the CCCTB indicates. We use this framework 
to assess a set of specific issues and scenarios. We focus on various apportionment 
formulas and estimate the effects of varying the longstanding proposal for formulary 
apportionment under the CCCTB, which combines weighted indicators of sales, 
tangible assets and employment, with two other possible apportionment formulas. 
Furthermore, we investigate the impact of loss offsetting between member states 
as a natural first step. We conclude with an exploratory analysis of the intra- and 
extra-EU application of unitary taxation. 
Third, we contribute to the literature by uncovering new results in our analysis. Overall, 
we find that the introduction of the CCCTB would have substantial effects on the EU. 
Three main new findings emerge from our analysis, which adds to the literature with 
respect to furthering our understanding of MNE taxation across borders. First, the 
proposed loss consolidation is likely to impose large revenue costs of about one fifth 
of the corporate tax base, with no offsetting benefits of comparable scale. Second, 
an application of the CCCTB proposals at only the EU level would overlook the 
extent of profit shifting out of the EU and could lock in unnecessary revenue losses. 
Third, major EU profit-shifting countries such as Luxembourg, Ireland and the 
Netherlands may experience significant revenue losses (which would, of course, 
depend on the design specifics and the way the proposal is implemented).
The rest of this paper is set out as follows. In section 2 we outline in detail how 
our research contributes to the literature, specifically in the context of four important 
areas. First, we discuss the BEPS agenda introduced by the OECD. Second, we 
describe the extent of profit shifting by MNEs, on the basis of the literature. Third, we 
discuss the EU’s proposal for the CCCTB and contrast it with a milder version that 
does not consolidate the tax base. Fourth, we discuss the various approaches used 
by scholars to estimate the impact of adopting a unitary approach. Section 3 outlines 
the methodology, and section 4 provides a detailed discussion of the firm-level data 
used in our analysis. Section 5 presents our central results and results for alternative 
scenarios. The final section concludes with specific policy recommendations that can 
lead to greater transparency in terms of the adoption of country-by-country reporting.
32 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS Volume 28, 2021, Number 1
2. Contextual background and previous literature
2.1 The BEPS initiative
Following the global financial crisis that emerged in 2008 and the subsequent 
fiscal pressures faced by many developed countries, significant public and 
political scrutiny has come to bear on the extent of tax avoidance by the world’s 
leading MNEs. In 2012, the G20 began to develop a response, which eventually 
led to the OECD’s BEPS action plan. The BEPS Project had widespread support 
from many developing and emerging countries where MNE profit shifting had 
long been recognized as a major revenue threat. The BEPS action plan, which 
began in 2013 and concluded in 2015, can be viewed as a renewed narrative, 
loosely following the harmful tax competition debate in the EU in the late 1990s 
(Radaelli, 1999).
There is growing evidence that the BEPS Project has not lived up to expectations. 
The initial ambition was weakened in a number of areas by an absence 
of full cooperation between OECD member states, so that the resulting measures 
lacked the necessary technical power. Politically, the perception of failure has 
led lower-income countries to coalesce around the G77 proposals for greater 
tax policy responsibility to be vested in the United Nations (UN) rather than the 
OECD. Not so long ago, United States policymakers were considering quite 
radical and untested proposals for corporate tax, such as the destination-
based cash-flow tax, that were entirely at odds with agreed BEPS actions, and 
EU policymakers are seeking to go beyond BEPS in a range of areas, including 
the adoption of the CCCTB within the Union. 
Common to each of these political responses is the desire to challenge the “arm’s-
length principle” that lies at the heart of the OECD-set rules for international 
tax and to challenge the decision taken at the League of Nations in the interwar 
years that set the world on a path to corporate taxation on the basis of 
separate accounting rules rather than unitary taxation (Picciotto, 2013). A unitary 
approach treats the MNE itself as the profit-maximizing unit and the group profits 
as the tax base to then be allocated between jurisdictions on the basis of a formula. 
Separate accounting, in contrast, rests on treatment of individual entities across 
the MNE as if they were individually profit-maximizing; hence, the requirement 
to account separately for each subsidiary and to report profits as they would be 
distributed if the subsidiaries were truly operating at arm’s length from each other 
and pricing intra-MNE transactions accordingly. 
The central strength of the BEPS action plan lay in the initial agreement to 
collaborate with the specific aim of reforming international corporate tax rules 
so that they “better align rights to tax with economic activity” (OECD, 2013: 11). 
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Although there is a broad consensus that the BEPS Project has fallen far short of 
the changes needed, an important element of progress has been the creation of a 
standard for country-by-country reporting by MNEs, based on an original proposal 
from the Tax Justice Network (Murphy, 2003; Cobham, Janský and Meinzer, 
2018). As things stand, these country-by-country data are only provided privately 
to some tax authorities – but there are growing moves, including a strongly 
supported European Parliament position, to make the data publicly available as 
originally intended. 
2.2 Evidence of profit shifting
The evidence clearly confirms not only the existence of serious profit misalignment 
but also its sharp growth over recent decades. For example, Cobham and 
Janský (2019) use data on United States MNEs to show the increasing extent 
of profit misalignment as a share of gross profits for a number of years and 
indicators of economic activity. Their estimates suggest that 5–10 per cent 
of United States MNEs’ global profits were misaligned in the 1990s and that 
by the early 2010s, this misalignment had grown to as much as 25–30 per 
cent of their global profits. Hence, the landscape has changed from being a 
relatively marginal problem to a first-order economic issue. If other countries’ 
MNEs are equivalently aggressive in their tax strategies, profit shifting may 
amount, in total, to a material distortion of global economic activity (Cobham 
and Janský, 2019). Similar studies, such as those by UNCTAD (2015) (Bolwijn 
et al., 2018), the OECD (2015) using different data sources and estimation 
strategies. While measuring the scope of BEPS is challenging given its 
complexity and existing data limitations, a number of recent studies suggest 
that BEPS is responsible for significant global corporate income tax (CIT, 
the IMF (Crivelli et al., 2016), Clausing (2016), Cobham and Janský (2018), 
Janský and Palanský (2019) and Tørsløv et al. (2020), report comparable 
estimates of profit shifting. 
The impact is also far from uniformly distributed. Cobham and Janský (2019) 
find that for United States MNEs, only a handful of jurisdictions (including Ireland, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands) consistently lay claim to substantially higher 
shares of global profits than their shares of “economic activity” – and that each of 
these jurisdictions levies an effective tax rate below at least 5 per cent but often as 
low as below 2 per cent. The losses have a significant impact on other countries, 
at all levels of per capita income. In absolute terms, the losses are greatest in the 
biggest high-income economies, but in relation to GDP and to existing tax revenues, 
the losses are greatest in lower-income countries. Huizinga and Laeven (2008) 
estimate tax revenue losses related to profit shifting for 21 European countries, 
with losses largely concentrated in Germany.
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2.3 Proposals for a common consolidated corporate tax base
The leading policy proposal in response to profit misalignment is a unitary 
approach to MNEs. Such an approach treats company profits as arising at 
the unit of the group, rather than the individual subsidiary, and so replaces the 
requirement to construct arm’s-length prices for intragroup transactions with 
the requirement for a basis to allocate profits across countries in which the 
group has operations. A number of countries already use such an approach at 
a subnational level. The United States uses a range of formulas to calculate its 
share of companies’ United States economic activity and therefore of the corporate 
tax base; while Canada uses a single agreed formula to allocate taxable profit 
between provinces. 
The European Commission’s earlier proposal for a unitary taxation system 
envisaged a single formula for EU member states to apportion the tax base among 
themselves. The European Commission (2011) proposed a formula for the CCCTB, 
which weighted tangible assets one-third, sales one-third and split one-third equally 
between compensation costs and (number of) employees. In the current proposal 
(European Commission, 2016), this formula remains but a number of other changes 
appear. There are now two proposals for Council Directives: one for a CCCTB, and 
one for a milder version, the CCTB, which differs from the CCCTB in that it does not 
consolidate the tax base but is seen as first step towards CCCTB.
2.4 Estimating the impact of the CCCTB on the EU corporate tax base 
Estimating the impact from such a change to tax policy is inherently difficult. Two main 
approaches can be identified. The first approach takes advantage of computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) models, such as the CORTAX model produced by CPB 
Netherlands (the Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis) and used by the European 
Commission (2016), which is designed to evaluate the effects of tax reform and 
assumes that individual agents within the economy use optimizing behaviour. 
CGE models rely on a number of structural parameters that capture economic 
agents’ behavioural responses to tax changes and thus are only reliable insofar as 
the parameters are correctly specified and estimated. Criticisms of CGE models 
tend to focus on the extent to which their outputs depend upon the assumptions 
made when constructing the underlying model – and in particular the combination 
of their high sensitivity to, and the often low visibility of, these assumptions, 
when sweeping policy claims are made. 
The European Commission (2016) provides estimates of the impact of introducing 
the CCCTB. In its baseline scenario it suggests that the CCCTB has very clear 
advantages compared with the no-action scenario. Profit shifting would essentially 
be eliminated. Accordingly, the CCCTB boosts wages and employment, 
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and reduces the cost of capital to boost investment. Aggregate GDP would 
increase, and hence economic welfare would improve. This is the case for two 
scenarios, the first including only MNEs and the second including all firms. In terms 
of total tax revenue, the European Commission estimates that there will be a small 
decrease (0.08 per cent of GDP for the EU-28 as a whole). This is due to a fall in 
corporate tax revenues, largely offset by an increase in revenues from other taxes.
The alternative approach, as used in this paper, puts more emphasis on static 
comparisons, using comprehensive firm-level data to estimate the impact on tax 
bases for each country had it used the CCCTB in a previous period. These estimates 
are then compared with the actual tax bases observed during the period under study. 
A number of studies have used this methodology in order to assess the impact of 
formulary apportionment, and it important to mention that their different results 
depend on the factors used and weights chosen. For example, Mintz and Smart 
(2004) find that apportionment between Canadian provinces results in less profit 
shifting. Clausing (2016) investigates formulary apportionment in the United States 
and suggests that it is unlikely to generate significant changes in economic activity. 
Cobham and Loretz (2014) use the Orbis database of company balance sheets 
and find that apportioning profits according to measures of actual economic activity 
would result in a major redistribution of the tax base at the expense of a particular 
group of jurisdictions, and that international loss consolidation as proposed under 
the CCCTB could reduce the overall tax base by about 12 per cent.
For Europe, examples of studies with findings of revenue effects for various 
apportionment formulas include Fuest, Hemmelgarn and Ramb (2007), Devereux 
and Loretz (2008), Nerudová, Solilová and Dobranschi (2016) and Nerudová and 
Solilová (2019). Furthermore, Nerudová and Solilová (2019) take into account 
the behaviour of the firms that can join the CCCTB voluntarily. They estimate 
that for the group of large firms above the set threshold of €750 million of 
consolidated turnover, which would require entry into the CCCTB system, 
the implementation of CCCTB would result in a relatively high decrease in the 
total corporate income tax base in the EU of 4.2 per cent in comparison with the 
current situation (mainly identified due to the cross-border loss offsetting during 
the consolidation regime, which many EU member states do not currently allow, 
as discussed by Nerudová and Solilová, (2019: 165)). The corresponding 
decreases for a group of large firms not meeting the threshold is 16.4 to 26.8 per 
cent and for small and medium enterprises is 46.0 to 58.6 per cent. In contrast 
to all of these studies, we use a more recent data set with a longer time series. 
Whereas Devereux and Loretz (2008) naturally evaluated the earlier CCCTB 
proposal with the best data available then and the latest study of Nerudová and 
Solilová (2019) uses 2014 data, in this paper we use the Orbis data for years 
between 2007 and 2015.
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The analyses cited are subject to criticism that they do not sufficiently take into 
account the behavioural dynamics that would follow from the announcement of 
a major change in tax policy, and therefore lack evidence at the starting point for 
policy changes that may affect the ultimate equilibrium. Relative certainty of these 
findings may however be preferable to the highly uncertain equilibrium analysis 
promised by CGE modelling. A major additional problem with any results based on 
firm-level data is the quality and coverage of those data, which we discuss below. 
3. Methodology
To simulate the effects of the CCCTB, we use a modified version of the approach 
taken by Devereux and Loretz (2008) and Cobham and Loretz (2014), who have 
simulated the effects of formula apportionment on corporate tax revenues in the EU 
and worldwide, respectively. Our approach is also similar to that of Nerudová and 
Solilová (2019) and other similar studies, but, in contrast, does not aim to model 
changes in the behaviour of the economic subjects such as those in a reaction to 
the CCCTB implementation. We use firm-level data from the Orbis database as 
follows. First, for each country we estimate a sum of positive profits under separate 
accounting (i.e. specification 1). Second, for each country we estimate a sum 
of profits and losses after the profit and loss consolidation (i.e. specification 2). 
Third, for each country we estimate a sum of profits and losses under unitary taxation 
(after the profit and loss consolidation at the MNE level and their apportionment 
according to formula on the basis of economic activity) (i.e. specification 3). 
In the results section we present three sets of results: specification 2 relative to 
specification 1 (baseline results for the loss consolidation – percentage change 
relative to sum of positive profits); specification 3 relative to specification 2 
(baseline results for the so-called CCCTB apportionment formula – percentage 
change under unitary taxation relative to the sum of firm-level, loss-consolidated, 
positive profits); and specification 3 relative to specification 1 (baseline results for 
the so-called CCCTB apportionment formula – percentage change under unitary 
taxation relative to the sum of positive profits). The first two sets of results shed light 
on the intermediate steps of consolidation and apportionment, but we consider 
the final, third set of results of the overall effects of the CCCTB to be the most 
important ones.
We now describe in detail some of the important aspects of the simulation. 
In describing our methodological approach to simulating the effects of the CCCTB, 
we first focus on the profit and loss consolidation within the corporate groups and 
only then investigate a number of ways of how the consolidated tax base can be 
apportioned among countries according to economic activity and compare the 
simulation results of various scenarios. After each unit of an MNE group residing 
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within the EU computes its profits and losses according to the harmonized 
common tax rules, the profits and losses of all these units are added together 
and consolidated at the level of the group’s parent. Perhaps the most complicated 
aspect of the envisaged consolidation is that it includes not only profits but also 
any losses. We deal with the consolidation of losses within the MNE groups in a 
similar way to Cobham and Loretz (2014), and we draw on their description below. 
Under the current system of separate accounting ( ), the taxable income and tax 
liabilities of an individual firm  in country  need to be adjusted to reflect the loss 
carry forward and the asymmetric treatment of profit ( ) and losses. With  denoting 
the taxable year and  the losses brought forward into the period, one can 
rewrite the taxable income and the loss carry forward of the current period as
 (1)
which can then be aggregated to the total taxable profit (for all units of an MNE 
across all countries ) under separate accounting as:
Under a unitary taxation ( ) approach, losses in individual countries will be 
immediately offset against profits elsewhere, and losses will be carried forward or 
carried back only at the corporate group level. Hence the profit ( ) and the loss 
carry forward ( ) will be
 and  (2)
To simulate the tax base effect of a move to unitary taxation with formula 
apportionment, we need information about the tax base under separate accounting 
( ), the tax base under unitary taxation ( ) and the apportionment factors ( ) 
that are chosen by the policymaker. The simplest way to measure the tax base 
is to use profit and loss before tax as reported in company accounts. In order to 
account for the possibility of domestic loss consolidation and loss carry forwards, 
we aggregate profit and loss before tax at the country-firm level and carry the 
losses forward to be set off against future profits, as in equation (1). Similarly, 
we aggregate profit and loss before tax at the firm level and carry remaining losses 
forward, as in equation (2).
In section 5 we present baseline results in what we call the CCCTB scenario 
with the European Commission-proposed formula, which combines weighted 
indicators of sales, tangible assets and employment (which consists of wage 
costs and number of employees) ( ). For the estimated simulations, we present 
the results of the loss consolidation as the percentage change relative to the sum 
of positive profits (a sum of positive profits seems a more suitable comparator for 
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this purpose than a sum of profits and losses). We present the results of the CCCTB 
apportionment formula as a percentage change relative to a sum of firm-level, loss-
consolidated, positive profits and, separately, relative to a sum of positive profits. 
These two comparators make it possible to disentangle the effects of consolidation 
and formula apportionment. As a next step we focus on various apportionment 
formulas, a choice of which has been found to be of vital importance by Devereux 
and Loretz (2008). Specifically, we explore the effects of varying the longstanding 
proposal for formulary apportionment under the CCCTB by considering the 
Canadian formula (weighted indicators of turnover and payroll, according to the 
formulary apportionment applied in Canada); and turnover (or sales) only.
In this manner, we are able to address some important aspects of the CCCTB 
proposals, but not all of them. We do address loss offsetting between member 
states, which turns out to have important revenue consequences, and a variety 
of apportionment formulas. We study the effects of varying the longstanding 
proposal for formulary apportionment under the CCCTB, which combines 
weighted indicators of sales, tangible assets and employment – for example, by 
considering the Canadian formula (a combination of wages and sales). We also 
discuss some of the caveats regarding the quality and coverage of the data that 
do not enable us to provide a full assessment of three specific aspects of the 
policy proposal. First, we are not able to study in detail the firm group structure 
and membership. For example, the analysis does not explore the effects of varying 
the current proposal that an entity be considered part of a group if the group holds 
more than 50 per cent of voting rights and 75 per cent capital ownership of profit 
distribution – for example, to 10 per cent thresholds in each case. Second, the 
analysis does not explore the effects of varying the current proposal that an entity 
be included in CCCTB if it has annual global turnover of €750 million or more 
(thus implicitly assuming that the proposal is either mandatory for all MNEs or that 
all MNEs voluntarily opt in), whereas, for example, Nerudová and Solilová (2019) 
deal with this aspect in more detail and explicitly model the behaviour of MNEs 
that can enter the CCCTB voluntarily. Relatedly, a recent research paper by the 
European Commission’s researchers (Barrios et al., 2020) exploit recently released 
unique survey data designed to provide comparable information on corporate 
tax compliance costs in order to assess the impact of the CCCTB. Their results 
suggest that the reduction in tax compliance costs would be associated with 
greater economic efficiency. Third, we only partially estimate the effects of intra- 
versus extra-EU application, i.e. the effects of considering apportionment purely 
within the EU, or globally. In the baseline results, we simulate the CCCTB only within 
the EU, given the current proposal and the characteristics of our EU-focused data, 
but we explore the effects of considering apportionment globally using other data 
sources. Future research should explore these aspects of the CCCTB proposals 
question, subject to data limitations.
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4. Data 
We use the largest commercially available database of company balance sheets, 
Orbis, provided by Bureau van Dijk. This is the same data source as that used 
by Cobham and Loretz (2014) but with different country coverage and periods. 
Whereas Cobham and Loretz (2014) use information on all firms worldwide 
from 2003 to 2011, in this paper we use only data for firms with an EU 
presence – headquartered both within and outside the EU (Clausing, 2018) – 
for years between 2007 and 2015. This means the sample includes companies 
from the 28 members of the EU (as of 2018, i.e. including the United Kingdom). 
This matches the coverage adopted by Devereux and Loretz (2008), 
whom we follow by using only individual unconsolidated accounts and 
aggregating them to obtain the country-by-country information. We focus 
only on multinational groups, defined as corporate groups that own 
at least one subsidiary in a different country.1 Our data set includes all 
EU-located, majority-owned subsidiaries of a global owner (i.e. with ownership 
shares above 50 per cent). For each company, we have information on the 
company’s country location and the location of its global owner. We exclude 
companies for which this information is not available. 
In total, the sample of firms includes up to 34,266 individual corporate entities, 
which consolidate in up to 19,223 groups. Table A1 in the Appendix shows the 
distribution of these firms and their ownership across countries and regions. 
The companies reside in the 28 EU member countries, and the global ultimate 
owners are based in 147 countries and territories, which we list according to 
regional groupings (with the exception of the EU), instead of a country-by-country 
table because of the large size.2 We use a time window of nine years, from 2007 to 
2015. The data are pooled, and the estimations thus reflect all nine years. For some 
companies, not all the necessary information is available for each year. To maximize 
the coverage, we calculate the resulting tax base allocation for each apportionment 
formula separately, which results in different sample sizes for each of the formulas. 
Table 1 reports the basic statistics for the profit measure (all values, both 
positive and negative), the apportionment factors and the other indicators of 
economic activity (only including observations with non-negative values). This is 
in line with Cobham and Loretz (2014), who drop all observations with 
negative values for the apportionment factors (i.e. with the exception of profits). 
1 We also retain only MNEs for which we have information for at least two companies, which implies 
dropping about 14 per cent of the observations for companies for which we have identified a foreign 
global owner but insufficient additional data.
2 We use the World Bank classifications (as of July 2015) to divide both companies’ and their global 
owners’ countries into regions and income groups.
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For each apportionment formula, only observations with available data are used in 
the estimation and shown in the results tables in the next section. Hence, we apply 
this logic for table 1, where we show information for all observations with available 
data. For most factors, we have the necessary information for between 10,000 and 
20,000 distinct companies and between 5,000 and 10,000 groups. For payroll and 
EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes), the number of companies with available 
data is relatively low. For eight economic indicators, table A2 reports the mean 
values by the firm’s country as well as number of firms in a given country. From 
the latter we see that in some countries, such as Cyprus and Lithuania, not many 
firms are available. Furthermore, for some countries, the availability of firm data is 
very low for some of the relevant variables, and we are therefore not able to show 
some of the results for some additional countries, such as Greece. The core of our 
analysis is based on the Orbis data for firms located in the EU.
This is the best available global data set, although it does suffer from some 
shortcomings, such as the selection bias described by, for example, by Cobham 
and Loretz (2014), Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015), Jones et al. (2018), Bajgar et al. 
(2018) and Garcia-Bernardo et al. (2021). Even some European countries often 
considered to be tax havens, such as Luxembourg (Zucman, 2014) or Malta, 
seem to be relatively poorly represented in the sample, and there are hardly any 
firms for Cyprus. For some countries, only a limited number of firms are available 
in the data: Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, for 
example (countries with less than 50 firms, highlighted with an asterisk in table 2). 
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics, observations for 2007–2015





P&L before taxes 174,619 10,078 228,680 -19,269,866 21,947,531 17,582 9,027
Turnover 146,177 132,872 1,017,437 0 73,854,761 14,781 7,655
Tangible assets 215,509 15,156 229,662 0 37,729,781 21,684 11,655
Total assets 224,754 443,502 7,568,782 0 729,167,703 22,613 12,153
Payroll 104,275 15,960 67,408 0 2,875,082 10,592 5,268
No. of employees 126,950 244 1,769 1 182,865 12,923 6,515
Taxation 115,033 2,209 17,370 0 1,615,343 11,556 6,256
EBIT 88,939 14,082 157,251 0 15,616,509 8,974 4,575
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Orbis data. 
Note:  All values except number of employees and the number of companies and groups are in thousand US dollars. All observations 
are included for profit/loss before taxes; for other variables, only observations with non-negative values are included.
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This poor coverage of some tax havens in particular can have implications for 
our analysis, such as not showing the full scale of a likely redistribution of the tax 
base or pointing the other way for some countries, but we are not able to quantify 
these effects owing to the very limitations of the data.
The issue of Orbis’s poor country coverage is of course of even higher concern 
beyond Europe. When we or others use the Orbis data to investigate the impact 
of extending the approach worldwide, for example through controlled foreign 
corporation (CFC) rules, one needs to be much more cautious, as a recent 
comparison of Orbis with other data sets and across regions shows (Garcia-
Bernardo et al., 2021). This also provides the case for country-by-country reporting 
data as a promising alternative to Orbis in the future. In addition, Tørsløv et al. 
(2020) show that some MNEs’ profits are not included in the Orbis data and that 
the coverage is severely limited among developing countries. 
5. Results
We show the main results in table 2. The results of simulating the loss consolidation 
using our data for the firms located in the EU are presented in the second 
(consolidation) column of table 2. Overall, the simulation results suggest that 
as a consequence of the loss consolidation the sum of positive profits would 
decrease by 21 per cent (according to our sample for the EU as a whole from 
a total of almost €1,000 billion to less than €800 billion). This is higher than some 
recent results. For example, Cobham and Loretz (2014) find that international 
loss consolidation, facilitated by a global switch to unitary taxation, would 
reduce the overall corporate income tax base by about 12 per cent. As is clear 
from table 2, there is substantial heterogeneity among the countries, which is 
in line with Cobham and Loretz (2014). The simulation results enable a simple 
comparison of allowing and disallowing loss offsetting between the EU 
member states. For some countries, including Austria, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg, the estimations suggest that the decrease in the corporate 
tax base due to the loss consolidation would be in the region of 50 per cent. 
In contrast, for some smaller countries – such as Malta, Estonia and Slovenia – 
the estimations suggest that tax bases would be increased by loss consolidation. 
Overall, on the basis of the presented estimates, we conclude that loss 
consolidation would likely result in significant reductions in corporate tax bases 
for the EU. If this policy step were introduced on its own, it seems highly unlikely 
that it would generate substantial benefits for governments, businesses or 
other stakeholders (such as companies having lower compliance costs 
and lower risks of double taxation, or other potential benefits that we 
do not explicitly consider here) as compared with these estimated costs in terms 
of tax revenue. 
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Table 2.  Baseline results (Percentage change)
Country
CCCTB relative 
to status quo  
(A relative to C)
Consolidation 
only relative  
to status quo  












(C relative to B)
Austria -59 -59 -1 -25 -33
Belgium -36 -30 -8 22 33
Bulgaria 71 45 17 1 45
Croatia* 53 65 -7 -39 -86
Czechia -7 32 -29 -25 20
Denmark -14 31 -34 0 14
Estonia -4 144 -61 -32 -55
Finland 8 -8 17 28 0
France -25 -24 -2 22 2
Germany -32 -37 9 17 42
Hungary* -49 -24 -33 13 -63
Ireland -38 -38 1 -12 8
Italy 27 4 22 25 23
Latvia* -43 -43 0 0 -56
Luxembourg* -55 -45 -19 -50 -8
Malta* -90 475 -98 29 -27
Netherlands* -51 -58 17 -16 -53
Poland -23 -7 -17 -11 -7
Portugal 2 39 -27 -53 -55
Romania 0 30 -23 -49 -44
Slovakia -23 22 -37 -59 -37
Slovenia -14 126 -62 -65 12
Spain -21 -30 12 6 8
Sweden -9 20 -24 -15 14
United  Kingdom -24 -34 15 6 18
Total -21 -21 0 0 0
Note:  Only a limited number of firms are available in the data. Owing to the very limitations of the data, we are not able to quantify the 
implications of these limitations, other than that this poor coverage of some tax havens in particular can have implications for 
our results, such as not showing the full scale of a likely redistribution of tax base or pointing the other way for some countries. 
The extreme case of Malta is one example of an estimate based on a limited number of firms (see also figures 3, 4 and 5). 
The at times contradictory results presented in this paper are somewhat consistent with other research that suggests that Malta is 
both a secrecy jurisdiction (Cobham, Janský and Meinzer, 2015) and a country vulnerable to international corporate tax avoidance 
(Cobham and Janský, 2018).
* Countries with fewer than 50 firms.
A = sum of positive profits.
B = sum of firm-level loss-consolidated positive profits.
C = CCCTB apportionment formula – under unitary taxation. 
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For consolidated losses, following an appropriately modified version of Cobham 
and Loretz (2014) as the baseline model, we provide estimations for a number 
of specific policy scenarios. In the main estimation results we compare the 
country-level results against the baseline results and the simulated tax bases 
following the loss consolidation. We start by investigating what we call the CCCTB 
scenario, in which the apportionment formula follows the current European 
Commission proposal. The results of simulating this using our data for the firms 
located in the EU are presented in the third (CCCTB formula) column of table 2. 
The table shows the percentage change under unitary taxation relative to the 
sum of firm-level, loss-consolidated, positive profits. According to the estimates 
presented, a diverse group of smaller countries (including Czechia, Portugal and 
Sweden) might expect their corporate tax bases to shrink by about one third, 
and others (Malta, Slovenia and Estonia) by more than half in terms of their loss-
consolidated tax base due to formulary apportionment in the CCCTB scenario. 
With the exception of France, for which we estimate the CCCTB formulary 
apportionment to have a negligible effect, all the other big Western European 
countries seem to gain with the loss-consolidated tax base. If the tax bases 
were apportioned according to the three-part CCCTB formula, the tax bases 
of Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and Italy would all increase by about 
10–20 per cent. Although these percentage gains are not that high, the fact 
that they occur in these big economies means that in terms of number 
of countries, most EU member states might expect their tax bases to 
decline following this apportionment. These findings fit well with the hypothesis 
by Wasserfallen (2014) that low-tax countries are more likely than high-tax countries 
to oppose the pooling of tax authority.
The first (CCCTB) column of table 2 shows the percentage change under unitary 
taxation relative to the sum of positive profits (i.e. the status quo and before any 
loss consolidation, in order to see the pure realignment effect, independent of the 
impact of loss consolidation). These results highlight that aligning profits (and hence 
the tax base) with the location of real economic activity, as the CCCTB envisages, 
would result in a very substantial redistribution of tax base among member states, 
at the expense of those members positioned aggressively as profit-shifting hubs 
and to the benefit of others. 
We now compare three scenarios that differ by apportionment formula only: 
CCCTB (one-third tangible assets, one-third turnover, one-sixth payroll, one-sixth 
number of employees), Canada (one-half turnover, one-half payroll) and turnover. 
The first, fourth and fifth columns of table 2 show results for these three formulas, 
with country-level estimates of percentage change under unitary taxation relative 
to the sum of firm-level, loss-consolidated, positive profits. For some countries, 
the estimates from the three formulas point in the same direction of either 
shrinking or expanding the corporate tax bases and often the estimates are of quite 
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similar magnitude, as in Italy or Estonia. For other countries, the apportionment 
formulas produce notable differences. Germany’s corporate tax base would increase 
by 9 per cent, 17 per cent or 42 per cent, depending on whether profits were 
apportioned according to the CCCTB, Canada or Turnover formula, respectively. 
According to the estimates, Slovenia, Czechia and Sweden should expect their 
corporate tax base to decrease under the CCCTB and Canada apportionment but 
to increase if the profits were apportioned on the basis of turnover. Of course, these 
kind of distributional differences, discussed in studies such as Devereux and Loretz 
(2008), might make the choice of the apportionment formula a political question. 
6. Conclusions and policy recommendations
The European Commission’s proposed CCCTB has been much discussed and 
analysed for more than a decade. The explicit unitary treatment of MNEs had been 
considered somewhat controversial, despite the economic logic of the approach 
and its successful use for corporate tax within a range of countries from Switzerland 
to the United States. Now, however, there is a growing interest in introducing one 
form or another of unitary taxation, as partly done by the OECD/G20 Inclusive 
Framework’s first pillar proposal for countries at all levels of per capita incomes 
(OECD 2020). European policymakers are actively considering the introduction of 
the CCCTB, or an alternative without full consolidation (the CCTB). 
This paper presents a new analysis of the likely impact on EU member states’ MNE 
corporate tax bases, for a range of scenarios. Overall, we find that aligning profits 
(and hence tax base) with the location of real economic activity, as the CCCTB 
envisages, would result in a very substantial redistribution of tax base among 
member states – at the expense of those members that are positioned aggressively 
as profit-shifting hubs. Adopting a formula for profit apportionment based on sales 
and employment seems preferable for various reasons (although any formula is 
bound to create new opportunities for tax avoidance). However, allowing the cross-
border transfer of losses could lead to a potentially dramatic reduction in tax base 
across the EU as a whole – especially if this is done separately from the introduction 
of a unitary approach, or if consolidation is not envisaged at the global level but 
rather at the EU level (since the latter would leave profit shifting out of the EU 
untouched). As a consequence, the EU should consider recasting the CCCTB as 
a worldwide approach by incorporating full-inclusion CFC rules (and ensuring that 
adoption of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive does not conflict with doing so). 
In our paper, we show that an application of the CCCTB proposals at only the 
EU level would overlook the extent of profit shifting out of the EU and could lock 
in further unnecessary revenue losses. In addition, it is obvious that this would 
not directly help developing countries despite the fact that, in comparison with 
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developed countries such as the EU member states, developing countries lose 
more tax revenue due to profit shifting by MNEs relative to GDP (Crivelli et al., 2016). 
This makes relevant any unitary tax proposals that include developing countries, 
such as those unitary taxation aspects of the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework’s 
first pillar proposal for countries at all levels of per capita incomes (OECD, 2020).
On the basis of our analysis, we offer the following policy recommendations. 
First, extending the approach to a worldwide system, for example through full 
inclusion of CFC rules, would simultaneously deal with profit shifting within and 
outside the EU. This appears to offer the best prospect for revenue-positive, 
welfare-enhancing reform. On the basis of the estimates presented, we argue 
that loss consolidation would result in significant declines in corporate tax bases 
across the EU – likely with no correspondingly large benefit, if countries did not 
switch to unitary taxation and formula apportionment. The revenue impact of loss 
consolidation, if introduced as a separate step, would be dramatic and immediate; 
any possible gains would be gradual and quite likely small in comparison.
Second, we further argue that locking in current EU member losses to the rest of 
the world – or expecting to continue the current exploitation of the rest of the world 
by some other member states, such as the three misalignment jurisdictions of 
Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – does not make good sense. In addition, 
there is a need to agree a timetable at the outset for a fully global application of the 
unitary approach (e.g. through full-inclusion CFC rules). 
Last, but not least, our findings also add further weight to previous conclusions, that 
none of the public data sets provide a suitable basis to assess the proposal – and that 
the Orbis data set in particular is systematically likely to understate both the extent 
of MNEs’ profit shifting, and of the redistributive potential of unitary approaches. 
We conclude that, to eliminate all uncertainty about the data quality underlying 
static findings, before committing to global application of unitary taxation, 
the European Commission should prepare a study on the basis of country-by-
country data (possibly those collected under the OECD framework, although 
they are limited by the reporting threshold of €750 million in turnover). As OECD 
country-by-country reporting is currently available privately to EU tax authorities, 
an immediate priority should be to collate these data and provide precise 
assessments of the range of policy scenarios. Committing to such a major policy 
reform without using this available data resource is unnecessary and would be 
gravely irresponsible.
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